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discussion of the contemporary international scene tend to skimp both 'history
and analysis, and are more successful as reminder than as narrative.
These objections, and others that might be noted, are perhaps only some of
the troubles that beset the pioneer. The 'book on the whole is a bold, careful,
and successful effort to examine the interwoven legal problems of international
law, constitutional law, and -federal jurisdiction, -raised 'by a particular compli-
cated and important contemporary issue. The author takes us outside the
machinery of United States governmental power and lets us look at a cut-away
model, as if he were leading a sophisticated civics olass of Martian candidates
for an American J.S.D. To his task he has admirably fitted a clear and un-
obtrusive style, which is related to typical law-review style as the whole-tone
scale is -to atonality.
If anything like the provisions for arms control being postulated in this book
or being discussed currently should be enacted, someone in the United States
will have to deal with problems of compliance, enforcement, and administra-
tion. Someone will 'have to turn to the drafting of statutes, regulations, ordi-
nances, and, possibly, even constitutional amendments. Whoever is charged
with these tasks, even if it be Professor Henkin, will find this -book an indis-
pensable desk-book for the first twelve months of this tenure. The rest of us
also must remain in Professor Henkin's debt.
LEoN LIPSONt
CAUCASIANS ONLY. By Clement E. Vose. Berkeley and Los Angeles: Uni-
versity of California Press, 1959. Pp. xi, 296. $6.00.
THE Restrictive Covenant Cases of 1948-Shelley v. Kraemer I and Hurd
v. Hodge 2-- were possibly the most noteworthy civil rights cases of their
decade. By denying on equalprotection and due-process grounds the power
of state and federal courts to give specific enforcement to covenants aimed
at the exclusion of Negroes, the Supreme Court greatly enlarged the choice of
housing available to Negroes and other minority groups. In addition, looking
beyond the direct impact of the decisions themselves, they facilitated the final
invalidation of state-supported segregation ;8 and the rationale of the Restrictive
Covenant Cases provided an important new dimension to the concept of state
action.
In Caucasians Only Professor Clement E. Vose of the Government Depart-
ment of Wesleyan University provides a fascinating "inside" view of the activi-
ties of the various special interest groups which participated in the Restrictive
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Covenant Cases. Although it is, of course, the importance of the decisions them-
selves that prompted Professor Vose's inquiry, his study is not principally of
the change they effected in the law, or even of the future implications of that
change. Thus, Professor Vose gives only brief attention to the next important de-
cision, Barrows v. Jackson,4 a 1953 case in which the Court held that a state court
could not enforce a restrictive covenant in an action for damages between co-
covenators. That case was significant not only as a further extension of the state-
action concept, but also for its impact on the doctrine of standing to sue; the
Court allowed an argument of racial discrimination in a law suit involving only
white persons. And Professor Vose does not mention at all more recent cases
in which the Court has indicated that there are limits beyond which the state-
action concept cannot, at least for now, be pressed.5 But these omissions are cer-
tainly understandable in view of the fact that the author's "chief aim was to learn
something of the role of interest groups in the judicial process, and perusal of
the United States Reports showed that a record number of separate antici curiae
briefs by organizations had been filed in [the Restrictive Covenant] cases.""
This is an interesting undertaking in which Professor Vose has performed a
useful service with commendable skill. Other studies have been made of the
various forces that enter into a decision of major constitutional importance -
and of the functioning of special interest groups.8 But nowhere else is the em-
phasis placed squarely upon the role played by special interest groups in co-
operating successfully to influence the outcome of a single major constitutional
case.
The Restrictive Covenant Cases presented difficult questions of law and
strategy for those who challenged the enforceability of the covenants. The ap-
parently well-established precedents all favored the validity of restrictive cov-
enants; and the nearly universal rulings had been that the same legal or
equitable remedies for breach were available here as for other breaches of
contractY At least since 1915 the NAACP had sought unsuccessfully to
4. 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
5. E.g., Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, 348 U.S. 880 (1954), judynicnt
vacated and cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 349 U.S. 70 (1955); Pennsylvania
v. Board of Directors of City Trusts of Philadelphia, 353 U.S. 230 (1957), on remand, 391
Pa. 434, 138 A.2d 844, appeal dismzised, 357 U.S. 570 (1958). See also Charlotte Park &
Recreation Comm. v. Barringer, 242 N.C. 311, 88 S.E2d 114 (1955), cert. denied, 350
U.S. 983 (1956). For a good discussion of the state-action problem, see Clark, Charitable
Trusts, the Fourteenth Aimendment and the Will of Stephen Girard, 66 YALz LJ. 979
(1957).
6. P. ix.
7. E.g., WasTnw, Tn- AxATOMY OF A CoNsTiTrToNA. LAw CAsE (1958); see
Vose, Book Review, 69 Yarz LJ. *716 (1960).
8. E.g., KEY, PoLrTcs, PARTIs, ANeD PaEssuRE Groups (2d ed. 1948) ; Note, Private
Attorneys-General: Group Action its the Fight for Civil Liberties, 58 YAI. LJ. 574
(1949).
9. See Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323 (1926). Section 406, RsTATM-,T,
PRoPERTY (1944), specifically approved the validity and enforceability of restrictive coven-
ants, despite the restriction on alienation normally disfavored in the law.
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upset this solid array of authority; but its efforts before 1948 had produced
at most a further entrenchment of the established doctrine.10 Accordingly,
it was recognized within the NAACP and elsevhere that if change was to
be effected new theories and different approaches would be necessary."1 Over
a period of time agreement was reached that the best chance of success lay
in simultaneous effort along two lines: (1) It was decided to develop the
then-novel legal theory that judicial enforcement of racially discriminatory
restrictive covenants was a form of state action forbidden by the concept of
equal protection. There was some precedent for this approach in cases which
forbade judicial participation in jury selection which excluded otherwise
qualified Negroes because of race. 12 But this principle had never been ex-
tended to judicial enforcement of restrictive covenants; indeed, it had been
implicitly rejected. 13 (2) It was also decided that the NAACP and other
interested organizations should develop statistical, economic, and sociological
data (a) to demonstrate the injury to Negroes and other minority groups
resulting from exclusion from desirable housing; (b) to show the harm to
the community as a whole, including members of majority groups; and (c)
to document the injury to American prestige abroad.
Principally as a result of these efforts, eighteen briefs amici were filed in
the Restrictive Covenant Cases by a wide variety of special interest groups.
There were, of course, a number of racial groups, including a Negro fraternal
organization and citizens' leagues for American Indians and Japanese Ameri-
cans. Other participants included religious organizations, unions, civil liber-
ties bodies, the American Association for the United Nations, and the United
States Govermnent.14 Professor Vose's discussion of the masterminding ol
the strategy which led to the more or less 'harmonious cooperation among
these diverse groups makes fascinating reading; particulary illuminating is
the discovery that in a campaign of this kind too many friends can prove
almost as embarrassing as too few.
The book is factually instructive on an important and previously little-
understood aspect of the judicial process, the role of amici curiae in cases
before the Supreme Court, especially the great public law cases. There re-
main, however, other questions not specifically resolved in the volume-indeed
they may be insoluble. But such questions must be faced by all courts when
they deal with constitutional issues, as well as by those individuals and groups
that seek to influence the development of constitutional law.
10. Pp. 50-57.
11. Pp. 57-73.
12. E.g., Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879).
13. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
14. The participation by the United States, by both brief and oral argument, was
especially significant. The decision of the Department of Justice to file a brief was announccd
following the publication of a recommendation to that effect by President Truman's Coni-
mittee on ,Civil Rights. To SEcuRE THESE RIGHTS 469 (1947). The Governmen's brief,
later published under the title PREJUDICE AND PROPE aTY: AN HIsToRIc BRIEP AGAinST
RACIAL COVENANTS (1948), was one of the best submitted to the Court.
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REVIEWS
The problems of decision involved in the Restrictive Covenant Cases raise
in microcosm the much-debated issue as to whether the Court should be "activ-
ist" in matters of constitutional law or whether it should play a merely passive
role. Activism is for many a term of opprobrium when applied to the judicial
process, while others may view it as the high obligation of the judiciary, at
least when interpreting the Constitution. In terms of "activism" versus "re-
straint," however, the debate may lack focus, for it is clear that in this sense the
United States Supreme Court has been "activist" from the time that John
Marshall cautioned that "we must never forget that it is a constitution we are
expounding."' 5 Perhaps, then, many of the demands for judicial self-restraint
have represented less an opposition to activism than a displeasure over par-
ticular decisions.
The Restrictive Covenant Cases raise, and Professor Vose discusses, a second
interesting and troublesome question. Was the Court moved to its in-effect
reversal of earlier case law by the newly developed legal theory offered by the
Negro litigants and their allies, or was the state-action concept merely a con-
venient handle for acknowledging new and powerful sociological, economic,
and even political forces? No one can know the answer for sure. The Court's
opinion plays it straight, as if nothing but a previously unresolved legal ques-
tion were involved; and the Court makes no reference at all to the factors w.'hich
moved the parties amici to participation. But Professor Vose is not deterred
by this silence. He seems to have found in the Court's solemn ?pronouncement
on discriminatory state action an implicit recognition of factors extraneous
to law qua law. He finds in the background of the six participating justices evi-
dence of extra-judicial predisposition to decide these cases against enforcement of
the covenants ;16 and he assumes that the Court was much impressed by the
weight of the sociological evidence assembled to demonstrate the evils of con-
tinued enforcement.1 7 This assumption was later used as the principal basis
for attack on the School Segregation Cases-that those decisions were based
on sociology and not on the constitutional text. But I cannot help doubting the
soundness of the assumption in both cases. Perhaps the legal argument em-
ployed by the Supreme Court is too simple for the legal sophisticate. In a way
the result seems so obvious that we are hesitant to believe that it could have
been so long overlooked if it were in fact sound. Yet this is exactly what I
believe to be the true explanation of the decision: Governmental participation
in action whose effect is to discriminate on grounds of -ace is per se a denial
of the equal-protection and due-process guarantees of the fourteenth and fifth
amendments respectively. Period. Why the law was so long otherwise I do not
pretend to understand. As to how important the sociological data was we can only
speculate; and I for one doubt that it played an important part in the decision.,,
15. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 407 (1819).
16. Pp. 177-83.
17. Pp. 184-210.
18. See Cahn, "Jurisprudence" in 1954 ANN. SURVEY OF A?. L. 809 (1955).
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In deference to the judicial process should we not simply accept at face value the
straightforward legal reasoning which the Court unanimously approved in
both the Restrictive Covenant and School Segregation Cases? Particularly
there appears to be no sufficient reason to look behind the language for hidden
-meanings when the constitutional text not only supports but almost compels
the result achieved in those cases. I cannot prove Professor Vose in error
on this point (nor in this most conjectural inquiry can he prove me wrong) :
but I am at least more comfortable in the belief that these Supreme Court
opinions can and should be read to mean what they plainly say.
ROBERT B. MCKA't
tProfessor of Law, New York University School of Law.
